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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 1987, the famous case of Miranda v. Arizona' celebrated its
twenty-first birthday. Although the police have become reconciled to it, at least to the
extent that attacks on it seldom appear in the police literature, 2 it has been under siege
from two other directions. First, in a series of cases, some of them quite recent, the
Supreme Court itself has questioned the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda.3
Second, the attorney general has recently urged that Miranda be overruled. 4 In this
article, I shall begin by briefly describing the holding and rationale of Miranda. Then
I shall canvass, also briefly, the reaction of the police, the Supreme Court and the
present attorney general. Finally, I shall play a game of "what if?." What if Miranda
were overruled-what test would courts use for determining the admissibility of
confessions? As you will see, courts would probably use the test that they used in the
good old days before Miranda-the "involuntary confession rule." How well that
rule worked in the past (and is likely to work in the future) and whether, in 1966,
there was a need for a change in the constitutional law governing interrogation and
confessions are the questions to which the bulk of this article will be addressed.
II. THE HOLDING AND RATIONALE OF MRANDA
The holding of Miranda is simply stated. The rationale is much more complex.
The holding of Miranda is that if the police want to interrogate a suspect who
is in custody, they must first give him the now-familiar, four-fold warning of rights
and then obtain a legally valid waiver of those rights. 5 They must advise him that he
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1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See infra, notes 26-31, and accompanying text.
3. See infra, notes 32-56, and accompanying text.
4. See infra, notes 57-63, and accompanying text.
5. 384 U.S. 436,444,467-79(1966). Preceding this holding was another-that the fifth amendment's prohibition
of compulsory self-incrimination is applicable to police custodial interrogation. Id. at 461. In 1966, this holding was both
novel and controversial. Id. at 506 n.2, 510-11 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (historically, privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination applicable only to proceedings in which interrogator had the power of contempt to compel answers).
Today, this holding seems to be accepted even by those who disparage Miranda's advice/waiver approach. See Grano,
Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 926-27 (1979). Contemporary acceptance is
due in no small part to Professor Yale Kamisar's trenchant articles, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments
on the '"New'" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. RPv. 59 (1966), and Equal Justice in
the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRININAL JUsTICE INOUR TIME I (A. Howard ed. 1965),
reprinted in Y. KAmSAR, PoLICE ImtR.oGA-o x AND Co.'ssloNs 27 (1980). See also A. BEsEIL, CO TIROL OVER ILLEoAL
ENroRmu:Nr or mE CpjLAL. Lw: RoLE or THE SUPF.EM COURT 101-03 (1955).
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has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him; that he
has the right to be represented by counsel; and that counsel will be provided for him
if he is unable to afford counsel. 6 Once a properly advised suspect has waived, the
police may interrogate. 7 If the police do not engage in interrogation, Miranda
requires nothing even though the suspect is in custody. 8 Conversely, if the suspect is
not in custody, Miranda is inapplicable even though the police engage in interroga-
tion.9 Miranda applies only when the suspect is both in custody and about to undergo
interrogation.
The rationale of Miranda cannot be stated so simply. Miranda was in fact not
just a single case but four cases involving unrelated crimes, all decided under the
same title.10 Early in its opinion, the Court observed that common threads ran through
the cases. Each suspect had been taken into custody and was therefore not willingly
associating with the police; each suspect had been taken to the police station, an
environment dominated by the police; each suspect had been placed in an interroga-
tion room and subjected to secret interrogation, that is, interrogation not open to
public view; and each suspect had confessed. "
Having identified the common threads, the Court asked what custodial police
interrogation is like and what effect it is likely to have on a suspect. 12 The questions
were frustrating, for the very secrecy of interrogation makes it impossible for all of
us, including judges, to know what goes on in the interrogation room, much less to
know how a particular suspect was affected.13 Not having first-hand knowledge, the
Court did the next best thing: it went to the library. There it found a plethora of
materials spanning three and a half decades. The materials included the 1931 report
of a Presidential Commission detailing the pervasiveness of the third degree in
American police tactics. 14 Also included were cases that the Court itself had decided
in the 1930s, '40s and '50s in which it was uncontroverted that extreme physical or
psychological pressure had been applied to the suspect. 15 Finally, and perhaps most
damning of all, the Court took note of police manuals of the '40s, '50s and '60s.
These books advised officers to overcome a suspect's reluctance by using tactics
such as (1) telling the suspect that lawyers are expensive and silence is an admission
of guilt; (2) acting always as though the suspect is guilty; and (3) giving the suspect
an inducement to confess by minimizing the moral seriousness of the crime, blaming
the victim or a third person, or suggesting other excuses. 16
6. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467-79 (1966).
7. Id. at 444, 475-76.
8. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
9. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
10. The other cases were Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (Syllabus).
11. 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 445-46, referring to IV NATIONAL COiMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE.tENr, REPORT oN LAWLEsNEBSS
iN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931).
15. 384 U.S. 436, 446 n.6 (1966) (citing, for example, Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Asheraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
16. 384 U.S. 436, 448-56 (1966). The Court relied principally on F. INBAu & J. REID, CRMNAL INTMROOATION A D
CONFESSIONS (1962); and C. O'HARA, FuNDAsNtrtALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956).
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Having perused the literature, the Court concluded:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than
to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge
of intimidation .... The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with
one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice.17
This passage is the crux of Miranda's rationale. Notice that it does not say that
the police in any of the four cases actually used tactics that were specially offensive-
such as force, threats or prolonged interrogation. Rather, it says that compulsion
inheres in custodial interrogation to such an extent that any confession, in any case
of custodial interrogation, is compelled and therefore obtained in violation of the fifth
amendment's stricture against compulsory self-incrimination.' 8
Having identified the problem, the Court had to solve it. The most obvious
solution was also the boldest and most costly: if custodial interrogation inherently
violates the fifth amendment, then custodial interrogation should be prohibited. 19
This solution, however, would have deprived society of a valuable law enforcement
17. 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966).
18. Although the reference to inherent compulsion also appears elsewhere in the opinion, 384 U.S. 436, 467,468,
478 (1966), other passages seem to suggest a different rationale. According to Professor Archibald Cox, the former
Solicitor-General,
The opinion, fairly read, does not assert that police interrogation in the station house or district attorney's office
is always coercive unless the stated rules or their equivalent are satisfied. Some of the language points in that
direction, especially a reference to "the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," but the thrust of the
argument seems to be that unless prophylactic measures are employed there will be inadequate assurance that
any confession obtained in secret is not procured by compulsion violating the privilege against self-
incrimination. The emphasis was on the need for prophylactic rules rather than the compulsion present in every
case. Such phrases as "procedural safeguards," "protective device," and "adequate protective device" are
scattered throughout the opinion.
Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determination, 40 U. CIn. L. REv. 199, 250-51 (1971).
Although it is doubtful that Professor Cox intended to question the constitutional legitimacy of Miranda, id. at
247-52, his "prophylactic rule" interpretation has given rise to a veritable cottage industry devoted to assessing whether
the Court had the constitutional authority to prescribe the Miranda warnings. Compare Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38
Vo. L. REV. 1417 (1985) and Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article 111 Legitimacy,
80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 106-11 (1985) with Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat
26 VasHnuRN L.J. 1 (1986) and Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHt. L. REv. 435 (1987) and White, Defending
Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAo. L. REv. 1 (1986). Professor Schulhofer's recent work touches on many
of the issues that I have raised in the present article. I regard it as "must" reading for anyone who wants to be well
informed about Miranda.
The legitimacy of Miranda is far beyond the scope of this Article, but I cannot resist the temptation to put a small
part of my thumb into the pie. Professor Grano says that a rule is prophylactic if violating it "may result in the reversal
of a federal or state criminal conviction even though the conviction itself was not obtained in violation of the
Constitution." Grano, supra, at 101. He goes on to say that whether a rule is prophylactic depends on what the Court says
is the rationale for its decision. Id. at 105-6. I take Professor Grano to mean that whether a rule is prophylactic depends
on the intent of the drafters, i.e., on the intent of the judges who comprised the majority-or on "judicial intent," if you
will. A judicial opinion, however, is merely a document, as is a statute, and "judicial intent" can therefore be analogized
to "legislative intent." Consequently, the varied techniques that we commonly use in interpreting statutes should be used
when the meaning of a judicial opinion is questioned unless a particular approach is inherently limited to the statutory
context. However, none of the articles cited above applies these techniques except to parse the unclear text of Chief Justice
Warren's opinion. Thus, the analysis in all of these articles is incomplete.
19. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MicH. L. REv. 865, 880-81, 883-84 (1981); Grano, Book
Review, 84 Mirc. L. REV. 662, 667, 672 (1986) (reviewing F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BucK.EY, CRIMINAL INTERROGAMON AND
CoNsszo.s (3d ed. 1986)).
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tool. Although there is an ongoing debate about the percentage of cases that could not
be solved without a confession,20 all concede that confessions are crucial in some
cases. 2' To prohibit a common form of interrogation-interrogation of a suspect in
custody-would have frustrated solution in these cases and made solution consider-
ably more difficult and time-consuming in other cases. Prohibiting custodial
interrogation was therefore too costly to be seriously considered by the Court.
22
In place of a flat prohibition, the Court compromised: force the police "to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" 23 by requiring the police to
advise the suspect of his rights and to honor any assertion of them. 24 This
compromise was intended to limit custodial interrogation to those suspects who were
willing to submit to it. Absent some indication of willingness, it was conclusively
presumed that the suspect's incriminating statements were compelled. 25
III. THE POLICE, THE COURT, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
A. The Police
In 1975, a graduate student in Criminology took my Criminal Procedure course
and elected to write a paper instead of sitting for the examination. His topic was the
attitudes of the police toward the Miranda decision as reflected in the police
literature.2 6 What he found is not very surprising: considerable hostility in the years
20. The debate is sketched in I W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEreuR 434-36 (1984).
21. See id.
22. An alternative-replacing police interrogation with judicial interrogation, see Kauper, Judicial Examiniation
of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 Micn. L. REv. 1224 (1932); Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons
Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. Cum. L. 1024 (1934)-might have mitigated the cost. However, directing the states
to substitute one form of interrogation for another would have been far more problematic than Miranda.
Another alternative-mandating the the presence of counsel during interrogation, see Y. Koousxi, Pousc
IrTRRooATION AND CONIESSIONS 47-49 n.l l (1980); Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 881-would have been even more
problematic, although for a different reason. Proposed in an Amicus Curiae Brief by the American Civil Liberties Union,
see Y. KAmISAR, supra, the required presence of counsel would, in all likelihood, have lowered the rate of confession
below a tolerable level. Id.; Grano, supra note 19, at 667. The Supreme Court recently indicated that it would not be
disposed to require the presence of counsel during police interrogation. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144
(1986) (Miranda does not require the police to advise a suspect that a lawyer has called to offer assistance.)
Other alternatives are canvassed in Caplan, supra note 18, at 1473-74. Professor Caplan suggests the following: (1)
requiring that voluntariness be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance (a step that the Court
refused to take in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986));
(2) supplementing the involuntariness doctrine with certain per se prohibitions against inherently coercive behavior, (3)
imposing a time limit on questioning; and (4) mandating compliance with state statutes requiring a prompt first appearance
in court. It has also been suggested that police interrogations be taped or filmed. See Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Orio ST. L.J. 449, 498 n.263 (1964). From a constitutional law standpoint, most
of these suggestions are at least as problematic as Miranda.
23. 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
24. 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966). That Miranda was a compromise rather than an all-out assault on the citidel of
custodial interrogation has been recognized for years by commentators. See Y. KAISAR, supra note 22; Kamisar, Book
Review, 82 Micn. L. REv. 1074, 1077 (1984) (reviewing L. BAKER, MIRANDA: CRME, LAw AND Poumcs (1983)); Schulhofer,
supra note 19. The Supreme Court itself has recently acknowledged the fact. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135,
1144 (1986).
25. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306-07 n. 1 (1985); id. at 349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 364,366-68
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Schuster, "You Have the Right to Remain Silent . (1975) (unpublished paper, copy on file with The
Ohio State University College of Law Library).
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immediately after Miranda, declining markedly with the passage of time. 27 He
concluded that if the police had not accepted Miranda, they had at least learned "to
live with it." '28 I have not surveyed the police literature since 1975, but I would be
very surprised if the situation had changed. 29 Although the Miranda dissenters
predicted that the decision would significantly impede law enforcement, 30 it has
apparently not had this baleful effect. 31 Consequently, the police have had little
reason to feel threatened by it and their continued reconciliation to it is understand-
able. It is therefore one of law's small ironies that after the police adjusted to
Miranda, the Supreme Court began to undermine it.
B. The Court
Miranda was a 5-4 decision. The opinion was written by Chief Justice Warren.
Concurring were Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Fortas. Dissenting were
Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White. (As will be seen, it is important to note
that one of the grounds of dissent was that the existing test for determining the
admissibility of a confession worked well and there was no need for Miranda.32 ) In
1967, Justice Clark was replaced by Justice Marshall, who certainly would have sided
with the Miranda majority. 33 However, in 1969, Chief Justice Warren was replaced
by Chief Justice Burger, and a year later Justice Blackmun assumed the seat of Justice
Fortas. Both Burger and Blackmun would have been with the Miranda dissenters, 34
27. Id. at 17-18.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Early in 1987, my research assistant surveyed the police literature published since 1975. She found no attacks
on Miranda. Outside the police literature, some law enforcement officials are quoted as having made their peace with
Miranda. See Toobin, Viva Miranda, NEw RE.uBuc, February 16, 1987, at 11-12.
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,500-01 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 541-43 (White, J., dissenting).
31. Although "[p]otential for generalization is undercut by frequently inadequate or unrepresentative sample groups,
by the lack of comparative data of police practices before Miranda, and by the differences in methods among the various
projects," S. KAOISH & M. PAULSEN, Ci.MINAL. Aw AND rrs PsocEssEs 1029 (3d ed. 1975), most of the studies tend to show
that Miranda has not significantly affected the rate of confession, crime clearance and conviction. See 0. SaPHsS, THE
SUrPaE COURT ANM Co.Wssos OF GUuT 169-74 (1973); Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation
of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1 (1970); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital:
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wenick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A
Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967); Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft
Protesters, 77 YAm L.J. 300 (1967); Project, Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YAtM L.J. 1519
(1967). Other studies are collected in White, supra note 18, at 19 n.99. Professor White rejects the assertion of Professor
Caplan, supra note 18, at 1464, that it is "inaccurate" to say "that Miranda has had little effect on police efficiency."
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 502-03 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 505, 524 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Justice- Marshall joined the "'pro-Miranda" majority in one of the earliest post-Miranda cases, Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), and has almost invariably taken a "'pro-Miranda" position. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly,
107 S. Ct. 515, 525 (1986) (joined Justice Brennan's dissent from decision that mentally ill suspect waived Miranda
rights); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (joined Justice Brennan's dissent from decision holding admissible
a confession that followed an admission obtained in violation of Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 674
(1984) (dissented from creation of "public safety" exception to Miranda); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1051
(1983) (dissented from decision holding admissible a confession obtained after suspect asserted right to counsel); North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 377 (1979) (joined Justice Brennan's dissent from decision that explicit waiver of
Miranda rights is unnecessary); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 724 (1975) (joined Justice Brennan's dissent from
decision that confession obtained in violation of Miranda is admissible for impeachment).
34. Former Chief Justice Burger consistently voted to narrow the reach of Miranda. Justice Blackmun has been
only slightly less consistent. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (both in majority); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984) (both in majority); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (Burger in plurality, Blackmun
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and their appointments therefore shifted the balance against Miranda. The shift was
strengthened in 1972 when Justices Black and Harlan were replaced by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist. 35 At this point, one may reasonably assume, six justices
believed that Miranda was not necessary. 36
In 1974, the Court decided the case of Michigan v. Tucker.37 The Court held that
it was permissible to use against the defendant the testimony of a witness who was
discovered as a result of statements obtained from the defendant in violation of
Miranda.38 The holding is noteworthy because it seems to give the police an incentive
to violate Miranda, but that is not why I mention it. Rather, I do so because of the
clever way that Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion describes the requirements of
Miranda. Early in his opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated:
For purposes of analysis in this case we believe that the question thus presented is best
examined in two separate parts. We will therefore first consider whether the police conduct
complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimin-
ation or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that
right.39
Subsequently, Justice Rehnquist characterized the requirements of Miranda as
"protective guidelines," 40 "recommended procedural safeguards," 4 1 "suggested
safeguards," 42 and "prophylactic standards." 43 Do not underestimate the significance
of these labels. Justice Rehnquist was saying that the fifth amendment is concerned
only with physical or extreme psychological compulsion, that the fifth amendment
does not mandate police to advise suspects, and that the requirements of Miranda are
therefore nonconstitutional rules created by the Court which are entitled to less
deference and which should be given less effect than the requirements of the Con-
stitution. 44 The point of Justice Rehnquist's labeling was not lost on Justice Douglas:
joined in dissent); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (both in majority); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)
(Blackmun wrote majority opinion, Burger joined).
35. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986) (Rehnquist wrote majority opinion, Powell joined);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (both in majority); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Rehnquist wrote
majority opinion, Powell joined); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (Rehnquist wrote plurality opinion, Powell
wrote concurring opinion); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (Rehnquist in majority, Powell did not
participate); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (both in majority).
36. The six were Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart and White, who dissented in Miranda, and Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.
37. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
38. Id. at 450-52. The interrogation in Tucker occurred before Miranda was decided, but the trial occurred after
Miranda. Consequently, Miranda was applicable to the interrogation, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), and
Tucker's own statements to the police were inadmissible.
39. 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 444.
43. Id. at 446.
44. That this was the gravamen of Justice Rehnquist's statement is apparent from the subsequent decisions in New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), discussed infra at notes 49-54 and accompanying text, and Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298 (1985), discussed infra at notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
Tucker was not the first source to suggest that Miranda's rules were nonconstitutional. Title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1983), prescribes that a confession is admissible in a federal criminal
case 'if it is voluntarily given." In determining voluntariness, the trial judge must consider whether the Miranda warnings
were given, but the failure to warn "need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession." Id.
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The Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional
basis. We held the "requirement of warnings and waiver of rights [to be] fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment Privilege" . . . and without so holding we would have been
powerless to reverse Miranda's conviction.
45
Justice Douglas, however, was a dissenter. The view of the majority was
apparently that Miranda's requirements were nonconstitutional.
In the mid-70s, I used to tell my students that Michigan v. Tucker was the first
salvo in a battle that might eventuate in the overruling of Miranda. I was wrong. The
battle never took place. Although some lower courts relied on Tucker to support a
narrow interpretation of Miranda,46 it played no role in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions in the 1970s. 47 Indeed, when Chief Justice Burger said in a 1980 concurring
opinion, "The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement
practices have adjusted to its strictures. I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage
it, or extend it at this late date, ' 4 8 I thought that Miranda was reasonably secure. I
was wrong again.
In 1984, the Court decided New York v. Quarles.49 The opinion, also written by
Justice Rehnquist, revived and used the labels of Tucker. A police officer entered a
supermarket late at night in search of an armed suspect, saw him, chased him, lost
sight of him, and eventually captured him in the rear of the market. When a search
revealed that the suspect's holster was empty, the officer, without giving Miranda
On June 11, 1969, the Department of Justice sent to United States Attorneys a memorandum and cover letter setting
out the Department's position on these provisions. The letter states:
Congress has reasonably directed that an inflexible exclusionary rule be applied only where the constitutional
privilege against compelled self-incrimination itself has been violated, not where a particular protective
safeguard has been violated without affecting the privilege itself.
Memo No. 584 Supplement No. 3, June 11, 1969, reprinted in 5 Crim. L. Rptr. 2350 (Aug. 9, 1969). In the
accompanying memorandum, Miranda was referred to in the following terms: "a means, suggested by the Court, by
which the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege may be safeguarded," id. at 2351; "a protective measure," id.; "specific
warnings [which] are not themselves constitutional absolutes," id. at 2351-52; and a protective safeguard system," id.
at 2352. The memorandum was drafted in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. It is of passing interest
that lawyer William H. Rehnquist was head of that Office from 1969 until his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1972.
See N.Y. Times, October 22, 1971, § 1, at 24, col. I (transcript of President Nixon's announcement of nomination).
45. 417 U.S. 433, 462-63 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (brackets in original).
46. See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemente, 552 F.2d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1977) (witness' testimony admissible); Hayes
v. Cady, 500 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974) (tangible fruits admissible);
Statewright v. Florida, 394 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (suspect's own statement admissible; Miranda violation
dubious).
47. Between 1974 and 1983, Tucker was cited in but four majority opinions in cases involving the admissibility
of confessions or admissions. In none of the cases was the rationale of Tucker significant to the outcome. See Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 397 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100 (1975). See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617
(1976) (impermissible to impeach defendant by proof that he remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings). In
Pennsylvania v. Romberger, 417 U.S. 964 (1974), on facts apparently similar to Tucker's, the Court vacated and
remanded for further consideration in light of Tucker.
48. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C. J., concurring). The majority opinion in Innis,
which gave Miranda's "interrogation" element a "rather generous definition," Kamisar, BooK Rviw, supra note 24,
at 1088, also demonstrated that Miranda was not moribund. The Court passed up an opportunity to limit "interrogation"
to encounters in which the police (1) speak directly to the suspect, (2) intend to elicit an answer, or (3) speak rather than
take provocative action such as displaying evidence. Id. at 1087. Instead, the Court defined "interrogation" to include
"'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)
(footnotes omitted).
49. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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warnings, asked where the gun was. The suspect's incriminating answer and the gun
to which it led were held admissible in a 6-3 decision.50 According to the majority,
public safety required that the officer locate the gun.5 1 Although public safety would
not justify the violation of a suspect's constitutional rights (for example, beating an
answer out of the suspect), 52 the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required.
Hence, the interest in public safety could trump Miranda. The linchpin of this
analysis was, of course, Michigan v. Tucker.53 The seedling that Justice Rehnquist
planted in 1974 bore fruit in a decade.5 4
Nine months later, it bore more fruit when the Court embraced both Tucker and
Quarles in another 6-3 decision. In Oregon v. Elstad,55 a police officer took a suspect
into custody in his own home. Without advising the suspect, the officer questioned
him, and the suspect admitted having been at the scene of a burglary. The officer then
took the suspect to the police station, recited the warnings, obtained a waiver, and
questioned the suspect further. The suspect confessed. At trial, the prosecution was
permitted to use the subsequent confession, but not the initial admission. The
Supreme Court held that this was correct. Had the initial admission been obtained in
violation of the suspect's constitutional rights, the full confession would also have
been inadmissible. But the initial violation implicated only Miranda's
nonconstitutional requirements, and it was therefore appropriate to apply a different
rule. 56
Decisions such as Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad cut the doctrinal heart out of
Miranda. They come close to saying that the Miranda Court went beyond its
constitutional authority by imposing on the states doctrines that were not themselves
required by the constitution. Do they mean that Miranda will be overruled? Not
necessarily. There is no exact correspondence between logic and law, and there are
also strong institutional pressures against overruling. But these cases increase the
likelihood of overruling, and, in tandem with the efforts of the attorney general, may
prove to be an irresistible force.
C. The Attorney General
Edwin Meese III became the Attorney General of the United States in February
1985. He brought impressive law enforcement credentials to the job: deputy district
attorney in California, adviser to the Governor on clemency and extradition, director
of a center for criminal justice policy and management, vice chair of the California
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id. at 655-58.
52. Id. at 655 n.5. Had an answer been beaten out of Quarles, the gun to which it led would have been
inadmissible. See I W. LAFAvE & J. ISmu, CpImNAL PRocEDURE § 9.5, at 760-66 (1984).
53. 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
54. An offshoot of that seedling was Justice O'Connor's concurring and dissenting opinion in Quarles. 467 U.S.
649, 660-74 (1984). Although taking the position that the suspect's incriminating statement was barred by Miranda,
Justice O'Connor argued that the gun to which it led should be admissible. Important in her analysis was her perception
of a difference between the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the protections of Miranda. Id. at 667-72.
55. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
56. Id. at 304-09 (relying on both Tucker and Quarles).
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Commission on Organized Crime, and professor of criminal law at the University of
San Diego. 57
Within six months of taking office, he launched an attack on Miranda. On July
9, 1985, in a speech to the American Bar Association, he applauded the decision in
Elstad, saying that it placed "the Miranda ruling in proper perspective, stressing its
origin in the court rather than in the constitution."-5 8 On August 25, 1985, he stated
during a nationally televised interview that Miranda was "infamous" and "wrong,"
and amounted to "inventing new law." 59 Repeating the argument of the Miranda
dissenters, he asserted, "We hadn't had any need for that type of law.., in about
175 years of history."-60 He went on to say:
I think the idea that the police cannot ask questions of the person who knows the most
about the crime is an infamous decision.
I think if a person doesn't want to answer, that's their right. But you've had time after
time all these ridiculous situations in which the police are precluded from asking the one
person who knows the most about the crime.6'
A few months later, in an interview with U.S. News and World Report, he
reasserted that Miranda keeps the police from interviewing the person who knows the
most about the crime, and that we had got along well without Miranda for 175
years. 62 Asked why suspects, who may be innocent, should not have the protection
of the right to counsel at interrogation, he replied that "[s]uspects who are innocent
of a crime should. But the thing is you don't have many suspects who are innocent
of a crime. That's contradictory. If a person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a
suspect.' '63
57. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1984, § A, at 16, col. 6.
58. Address of The Honorable Edwin Meese Ill, Attorney General of the United States, before the American Bar
Association, July 9, 1985, at 10 (copy on file with The Ohio State University College of Law Library).
59. The Washington Post, August 26, 1985, § A, at 6, col. I.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. U.S. NEws & WoRUw RrPOR, October 14, 1985, at 67.
63. Id. Professor Yale Kamisar, who has influenced the modem law of interrogation more than any other scholar,
see, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1146 (1986); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980), was
moved to call the attorney general's remarks "really incredible."
If a first-year law student had said this, you'd really give them [sic] a tongue-lashing.
He's not that stupid. Obviously he knows that what he's saying is simply inconsistent with the most basic
notions of criminal process . . . .He sounds like a comic-strip character in "Dick Tracy."
The Washington Post, Oct. 11, 1985, § A, at 6, col. 3, (omission in original).
The attorney general subsequently backed off. A spokesperson said, "Meese believes that one is innocent until
proven guilty in our system [but] Miranda has had an impact in terms of enabling people who would have been found
guilty in a criminal trial . . . to go free." Id. (omission in original). The meaning of this statement is not clear. If it was
intended to assert that Miranda has had a significant effect on the rate of confession, conviction and crime clearance, it
is not supported by the evidence. See authorities cited supra, note 31. If it was intended as a complaint that Miranda
sometimes results in the exclusion of important evidence, it is true. It should be noted, however, that Miranda results in
the exclusion of evidence only when the police have violated their obligation to give warnings or obtain a valid waiver.
The Justice Department has continued its assault on Miranda. In January 1987, the Department released a report that
had been submitted almost a year earlier, sharply criticizing and urging the overruling of Miranda. OFFIcE OF LEGAL POLICY,
U.S. DEP'T. OF JsTICE, Rxror ro TE ArrosRs Ge-ERAL ON THE LAw OF PRE-TRtAL ImT.RROGoAVO (Feb. 12, 1986). Relying
heavily on Tucker, Quarles, and Elsiad, the Report recommended that the Justice Department create and seek review of
a case raising the issue of whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501, see supra, note 44, is constitutional. Justice Department officials
were later quoted as saying that the attorney general supported the proposal. The Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 22, 1987,
§ A, at 8, col. 1. The Solicitor General, however, is apparently less enthusiastic. According to Legal Times, May 4, 1987,
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As will appear from the balance of this article, I regard most of the Attorney
General's complaints, particularly the complaint that we had got along well without
Miranda for 175 years, as footless. Whether valid or not, however, the complaints
come from the attorney general, the head of the United States Department of Justice,
this country's chief law enforcement officer. For that reason alone they are
significant. The Attorney General has in effect called for the overruling of Miranda.
That call and the denigration of Miranda by Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad have to
make one question the fate of Miranda, have to make one ask "what if?."
IV. WHAT IF MIRANDA WERE OVERRULED?
A. Introduction
Let me restate the questions I asked at the outset: What if Miranda were
overruled-what test would courts use for determining the constitutional admissibil-
ity of confessions? How well would that test work? To these questions I want to add
another. Is it true, as the Miranda dissenters and the Attorney General have said, that
the law of confessions got along well for 175 years without Miranda? In order to
answer these questions, it is necessary to consider what the law of interrogation was
like in the good old days before Miranda. For reasons that will become apparent, I
shall deal with the developments in reverse chronological order.
B. The Law Before Miranda
1. Escobedo v. Illinois
Escobedo v. Illinois64 was decided two years before Miranda. The Court held
inadmissible a confession obtained by custodial interrogation after the police refused
to let a suspect see his lawyer who was at the police station. The Court held that the
suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated, 65 but also noted that no
one had advised the suspect of his rights under the sixth and fifth amendments. 66
From a doctrinal standpoint, Escobedo is a lineal ancestor of Miranda.67 The line-up
of Justices was the same in both cases, 68 and those who have criticized Miranda have
also criticized Escobedo.69 Thus, it is an absolute certainty that today's Supreme
Court would not revert to Escobedo if it overruled Miranda.70
p. 2, col. 1, "Solicitor General Charles Fried has scotched a proposal by aides close to Attorney General Edwin Meese
III to ask a federal appeals court to overturn the Supreme Court's landmark 1966 ruling in Miranda v. Arizona."
64. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
65. Id. at 491.
66. Id. at 483, 485, 491.
67. The kinship between Escobedo and Miranda is apparent from the Miranda opinion. See 384 U.S. 436, 440,
442, 465-66, 475 (1966).
68. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Goldberg. The
dissenters were Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White.
69. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 18, at 1437-43.
70. In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), the Court held that Escobedo was inapplicable unless the suspect
,made a relatively unambiguous request for counsel. Since few unwarned suspects are likely to make any request for
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2. Massiah v. United States
Massiah v. United States7 t was decided a few months before Escobedo and was
relied on in Escobedo.72 After Massiah had been indicted, federal agents induced a
co-defendant to engage Massiah in conversations during which Massiah incriminated
himself. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that Massiah's right to counsel under the
sixth amendment had come into being at the time of indictment, and that the incrim-
inating statements had been elicited in violation of the right.73 As subsequent cases
have insisted, the concerns of Massiah and Miranda are different. 74 The concern of
Massiah is the proper functioning of the adversary system-the distance that one
adversary has to maintain from the other, and the importance of adversaries com-
municating through, not behind the back of, counsel. 75 By contrast, the concern of
Miranda is freedom from compulsory self-incrimination. 76 As a result of these dif-
ferences, the Massiah right to counsel comes into play only after the government has
demonstrated some commitment to prosecute the suspect. 77 The earliest stage at which
the Supreme Court has found this commitment is the first appearance in court after
the filing of preliminary charges. 78 That stage, however, comes after the ordinary
police-station interrogation stage. Thus, the Massiah right to counsel is wholly in-
applicable to a run-of-the-mill interrogation, 79 and could not be viewed by the Supreme
Court as an alternative to Miranda. Moreover, many who have attacked Miranda have
also attacked Massiah.80 In their eyes, Massiah is not a part of the good old days.
Rather, like Escobedo, it is an ancestor, although more remote, of Miranda.
3. Wong Sun v. United States
In Wong Sun v. United States,8 1 the Court held inadmissible a confession that
counsel, Escobedo gives virtually no protection in the vast majority of confession cases. Consequently, it could hardly
be viewed as an appropriate check on police interrogation. Even if Frazier had not been decided, however, the Court
would not revert to Escobedo. It is generally agreed that Escobedo's reliance on a right-to-counsel rationale was but a
halting step in the direction of Miranda's self-incrimination theory, and that Escobedo today has no independent vitality,
indeed, that it has been displaced by Miranda. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1146 (1986); Y. KAsussA, supra
note 22, at 162-63 and n.29; Kamisar, Book Review, supra note 24, at 1076. It is therefore clear that if Miranda were
to fall, Escobedo would too.
71. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
72. 378 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1964).
73. 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
74. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980).
75. Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484, 487 (1985); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
76. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1140, 1146 (1986).
77. Id. at 1147.
78. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977).
79. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1145-47 (1986).
80. Of the four Miranda dissenters, three (Justices Clark, Harlan, and White) had earlier dissented in Massiah.
(The fourth, Justice Stewart, wrote the opinion in Massiah). Chief Justice Burger disparaged both Miranda and Massiah
in his dissenting opinion in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416, 423, 424, 425 (1977). Justice Rehnquist, whose
opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), undercut Miranda, later urged that Massiah's "language, if not its
actual holding should be re-examined." United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 290 (1980) (dissenting opinion). See also
Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 U. MiNN. L. REv. 47
(1964) (criticizing both Massiah and Escobedo).
81. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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was the product of an arrest that violated the fourth amendment. The primary concern
of Wong Sun is the constitutionality of custody, not what the police do to obtain a
confession after the suspect is in custody. 82 Consequently, although the Wong Sun
doctrine bears on the admissibility of a confession, it is irrelevant to police
interrogation tactics and thus cannot be a substitute for Miranda.
4. The McNabb-Mallory Rule
It is a requirement of federal criminal procedure that an arrestee be taken without
unnecessary delay for a first appearance in court.83 In a series of cases beginning in
the 1940s, the Supreme Court held that a confession was inadmissible if obtained
during a period of unnecessary delay. 84 The holdings, known as the McNabb-Mallory
rule, sought to deal with the problem of abusive interrogation by the rather blunt
device of depriving the police of time to interrogate. 85 The rule was not based on the
Constitution. 86 Rather, it was based first on a federal statute8 7 and later on Rule 5(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 88 As a result, the rule was applicable
only to federal cases, not to state cases. 89 Moreover, even in this limited context, it
was all but destroyed by a provision of a 1968 federal statute which gives federal
interrogators a grace period of six hours for interrogation. 90 This provision was
enacted because it was felt that the McNabb-Mallory rule was too great an
impediment to police interrogation. 91 For all of these reasons, the rule could not and
would not be regarded as an acceptable substitute for Miranda.
What I have just done is to take you on a brief excursion of four rules that
antedated Miranda. The Supreme Court would regard none of these rules as a
substitute for Miranda. If the Court overruled Miranda, none of these rules would
come to the fore. What is left? The answer to this question is that the only remaining
pre-Miranda rule is the involuntary confession rule. 92 Unless the Supreme Court is
disposed to create a new approaach for police interrogation, it is likely that the Court
would revert to this rule. 93
82. Of course, in determining whether a confession is the "product" of an unconstitutional arrest, courts are
required to consider whether the police exploited the arrest. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). However, this
does not mean that the Wong Sun doctrine is, or was ever intended to be, a check on the methods of police interrogation.
Rather, courts should consider, among other factors, the length of time between arrest and confession and whether there
are circumstances intervening between arrest and confession that dissipate the taint of the unconstitutional arrest. See id.
However, the giving of Miranda warnings does not per se dissipate the taint. Id.
83. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
84. For a discussion of the cases, including McNabb and Mallory, see Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule:
Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958).
85. The reference is to Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
86. W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, CRImNAL PRocEDURE 272 (1985).
87. Id. at 270.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 272.
90. Id. at 271-72. The statute is a provision of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(c) (1983).
91. See Recent Statute, 82 HAsv. L. Rsv. 1392 (1969).
92. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 84, at 262, 264-69.
93. It is unlikely that the Court would be willing to create a new constitutional law test for determining the
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5. The Involuntary Confession Rule
a. Verbalization
It violates due process of law for the prosecution in a criminal case to use the
defendant's involuntary confession against him. 94 Whether a confession is involun-
tary must be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances-the
characteristics of the defendant and the environment and techniques of interroga-
tion.95 Under the "totality of the circumstances" approach, virtually everything is
relevant and nothing is determinative. 96 If you place a premium on clarity, this is not
a good sign.
b. Origin
The involuntary confession rule originated as a part of the English common law
of evidence. 97 Its purpose was to exclude putatively unreliable evidence. 98 The
Supreme Court adopted the rule for federal cases in 1884.99 Prior to 1936, it was not
clear whether the rule had any constitutional law dimension or was just a common law
rule. 10 In that year, however, the Court for the first time held an involuntary
confession inadmissible in a state criminal case.' 0' Since the Court lacks the authority
to prescribe mere rules of evidence for state proceedings, it had to base inadmissi-
bility on the Constitution. It chose the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
admissibility of confessions. Although other tests have been suggested from time to time, see note 22, supra, they are as
problematic as Miranda, id., and the court would hardly move in their direction.
Eight years ago, Professor Grano urged the adoption of a modified voluntariness rule. Grano, supra note 5. Under
this modification, a confession would be involuntary only if a "hypothetical person of average or ordinary firmness"
would yield to the particular pressure applied by the police. Id. at 899. The current voluntariness test suffers from
intolerable vagueness, see infra, notes 94-160, and accompanying text, and the suggested modification gives no greater
clarity to the law or guidance to police officers and judges. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 873-77. On the other hand,
a court might be attracted to it because it gives suspects less protection than the current test. See Grano, supra note 5, at
901-09.
Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986), suggests that the Court is satisfied with the current voluntariness rule.
The defendant confessed as a result of hearing the voice of God commanding him to confess or to commit suicide. Id.
at 519. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that a confession is voluntary if it is not produced by police coercion even though
the suspect has a serious mental disorder. "Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right of a
criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated--could respondent's present
claim be sustained." Id. at 521. The Court was not disposed to establish a new and more lenient test for determining
voluntariness because the exclusionary rule " 'imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by
its prescription of what concededly is relevant evidence.'" Id. On the other hand, nothing in the opinion precludes a
consideration of a suspect's peculiarities as long as there is police coercion. Indeed, the Court observed that "'certain
interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect are so
offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.'" Id. at 520 (emphasis added) quoting from Miller
v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. at 445, 449 (1985). The quotation necessarily is a rejection of Professor Grano's objective theory.
94. W. LkFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 84, at 265.
95. Id. at 263, 266.
96. Grano, supra note 5, at 907. This common characterization of the rule ignores cases in which single factors
seem to have dictated the result. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 consecutive hours of interrogation);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (brutal physical force).
97. Herman, supra note 22, at 452-53 n.17.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 453.
100. See W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAi, supra note 84, at 264-65.
101. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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c. The Meaning of "Voluntary" and "Involuntary"
Stating what the rule is and how it originated and developed leaves out the most
important matter. If the words "voluntary" and "involuntary" describe admissible
and inadmissible confessions, it is crucially important to define these terms. This
definitional task can be approached from at least three directions: using the definition
found in judicial opinions, extrapolating or inferring a definition from the facts and
results of cases, and inferring a definition from the goals or objectives of the rule.
(1) Using the Definition Found in Judicial Opinions
The involuntary confession rule received its greatest development and direction
between 1936 and 1963.102 In 1973, in the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,0 3 the
Court surveyed what it had done. (I am tempted to say that it surveyed the wreckage,
but that remains to be seen). It began by acknowledging that "'[tihe notion of
'voluntariness' ... is itself an amphibian."' '0 4 (If you will think about this
statement for a moment, you will see that it is another bad sign). Then it posed and
rejected two diametrically different definitions of "voluntary." Under the first, any
confession is voluntary if made during consciousness, even if made to avoid
torture.'0 5 This definition would result in the admissibility of virtually every
confession. Under the second definition, a confession is voluntary only if volun-
teered, that is, only if made without any police inducement or effort such as
interrogation. 10 6 This definition would make most confessions inadmissible. Having
rejected the extremes, the Court was forced toward the middle. It said, "[T]he
ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the
confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice."' 1 7 If you
attend closely to this definition, you will immediately see how problematic it is. The
words "free" and "unconstrained" are hardly terms of legal art. In nonlegal
discourse, moreover, they have no clear meaning. Beyond, that, however, the Court
is not even using the words in an absolute sense. The question, according to the
Court, is not whether the defendant's choice was free or unconstrained, but whether
it was "essentially" free or unconstrained. Presumably, "some" constraint is
permissible as long as it does not destroy the "essence" of freedom of choice. I am
being picky about the words the Court used because I want you to see three related
points. The first is that the Court's definition permits the police to interrogate a
reluctant suspect-one who would rather not be interrogated-and to put some
pressure on the suspect to get a confession. If the police get a confession, it will be
admissible as long as the police did not go too far. The second point I want you to
see is that the Court's definition gives us no clear criterion for determining whether
102. Herman, supra note 22, at 457 n.49.
103. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
104. Id. at 224, quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604-05 (1961).
105. 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 225.
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the police did go too far in a particular case. The third point is that the involuntary
confession rule is a compromise between the individual's interest in being free from
any pressure to confess and society's interest in solving crimes.108 Indeed, the very
fact that the involuntary confession rule is a compromise probably accounts for the
vagueness of the Court's definition of voluntariness. Whatever the reason, however,
it is perfectly plain that the Court's statement is not helpful and that we must look
elsewhere for the definitions of "voluntary" and "involuntary."
(2) Extrapolating or Inferring a Definition from the Facts and Results of Cases
A second technique for ascertaining a definition is to look closely at the facts and
results of a group of cases and ask, "What definition must the Court be using to get
these results on these facts?" As a basis for using this technique, I have chosen four
cases, one from each of the first four decades in which the involuntary confession rule
has been applied to state cases.
The first of these cases is Brown v. Mississippi,0 9 which is also the first state
case in which the United States Supreme Court held a confession inadmissible. The
three defendants were poorly educated black men. One was taken into custody by a
deputy sheriff and other persons. When he protested his innocence, he was twice
hanged from a tree limb. When he continued to protest his innocence, he was tied to
the tree and whipped. Still not having confessed, he was then released. A day or two
later, the same deputy arrested the defendant and drove him to jail by a route that
went through Alabama. While in Alabama, the deputy severely whipped the
defendant and said that he would continue to do so until the defendant agreed to
confess to a statement that the deputy would dictate. The defendant confessed. 0
The other two defendants were arrested, made to strip, and whipped with a
leather strap and buckle until they confessed to every detail of a confession provided
by the deputy. They were threatened with additional force if they recanted.'
The next day, all three defendants were brought before the sheriff and others and
repeated their confessions. The repeated confessions were used against them at trial
and they were convicted of murder and sentenced to death."l 2 The United States
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the convictions, holding that the use of
confessions obtained under "compulsion by torture"' " 3 violated due process of
law.114 Although the Court did not explicitly refer to the involuntary confession rule
or cite any involuntary confession case, Brown is generally regarded as the beginning
of the modem era of the involuntary confession rule.I5
108. "This Court's decisions reflect a frank recognition that the Constitution requires the sacrifice of neither liberty
nor security. The due process clause does not mandate that the police forgo all questioning, or that they be given carte
blanche to extract what they can from a suspect." id.
109. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
110. Id. at 281-82.
111. Id. at 282.
112. Id. at 282-84.
113. Id. at 285.
114. Id. at 286.
115, W. LAFAE & J. IsRA., supra note 84, at 265. That "compulsion by torture" has not been wiped out is shown
by People v. Wilson, 116 11. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987). A unanimous court held that the State had failed to prove
1987]
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The second case is Ashcraft v. Tennessee. l i6 The defendant, a 45-year-old
caucasian, had overcome a meager education to achieve a measure of financial
success as a skilled construction worker. Suspected of complicity in the murder of his
wife, he was arrested and interrogated for thirty-six consecutive hours by relays of
interrogators. As each group of interrogators became exhausted, it was replaced by
a new group. As Ashcraft became exhausted, he was not replaced by a surrogate
suspect. Eventually he confessed, was convicted, and was sentenced to long-term
imprisonment. 117 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
confession was involuntary." 8 Usingthe language of presumptions in an apparent
departure from the "totality of the circumstances" approach, the majority stated that
thirty-six hours of relay interrogation was "inherently coercive. ' ' " 9
The third case is Spano v. New York.120 Spano was a foreign-born, 25-year-old
man with a junior high school education. He had a history of emotional instability,
and had been found unfit for military service after failing an intelligence test. After
being indicted for murder, Spano hired a lawyer and surrendered to the police. For
the next eight hours, he was continuously interrogated by various persons in two
different locations. He repeatedly asked to see his lawyer, but his requests were
denied. Not having obtained a confession, the authorities enlisted the services of a
probationary officer, Bruno, whom Spano had known since childhood and whom
Spano had telephoned shortly before he surrendered. Bruno was instructed to pretend
that Spano's telephone call had got him into trouble, that he might lose his job, and
that he, his pregnant wife, and their three children would suffer unless Spano
confessed. After the fourth entreaty by Bruno, Spano confessed. 121 The Supreme
Court held that Spano's will had been overborne and that his confession was
involuntary and inadmissible. 22
The fourth case is Haynes v. Washington.123 Haynes was a skilled sheet-metal
worker, about 30 years old, "of at least average intelligence, who, in the eleven years
preceding his trial, had been convicted of drunken driving, resisting arrest, being
without a driver's license, breaking and entering, robbery, breaking jail, and taking
a car."1 24 After a filling station robbery, Haynes was briefly interrogated on the street
and then released. Seconds later, he returned to the police car, admitted his guilt, and
identified the filling station. He was taken to the police station where he again
admitted his guilt during a thirty-minute interrogation. The next morning, he made
two more confessions both of which were transcribed. He refused to sign the
that injuries to a suspect's head, torso and leg, inflicted while the suspect was in police custody, were sustained after the
suspect had confessed rather than during the interrogation.
116. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
117. Id. at 154.
118. Id. at 144, 148-51.
119. Id. at 154.
120. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
121. Id. at 316-19.
122. Id. at 323-24.
123. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
124. Herman, supra note 22, at 455-56.
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transcript of the later confession, but did sign the earlier transcript.' 2 5 Prior to
signing, "he had been held incommunicado for about sixteen hours, contrary to state
law, and, although he had requested permission to call his wife on the morning
following the arrest, he was told that 'when I had made a statement and cooperated
with them that they would see to it that as soon as I got booked I could call my
wife."' 1 26 Notwithstanding the fact that Haynes made no claim of physical abuse,
lack of sleep or food, or prolonged interrogation, t27 the Supreme Court in a 5-4
decision, held that his will had been overborne by the "express threat of continued
incommunicado detention,"' 128 and that the signed confession was therefore inad-
missible.
The four cases I have just mentioned are alike in one respect: the confession was
held involuntary and inadmissible in each. In all other respects, they are dissimilar.
They involved suspects with different personal characteristics and they run a huge
gamut of police interrogation tactics from the brutal beatings in Brown to "so mild
a whip" 1 29 as the incommunicado detention in Haynes. These very differences make
it hard for us to extrapolate or infer a definition of involuntariness from the facts and
results of these cases. If a definition is to be found, we must look elsewhere. 30
(3) Inferring a Definition from Goals or Objectives
The third and final approach to the definitional problem is the functional
approach: to try to infer a definition from the goals or objectives that the Court has
attributed to the involuntary confession rule. A careful reading of the Court's more
than forty involuntary confession cases discloses not one but five different objectives.
I am not saying that every objective appears in every case. That is not so. But it is
so that five objectives can be extracted from the entire body of Supreme Court cases.
The objectives are: (1) to deter the police from engaging in conduct that may produce
an unreliable confession;' 3 1 (2) to deter the police from engaging in conduct so
offensive to the minimum standards of a civilized society that it shocks the conscience
of the Court; 132 (3) to deter the police from engaging in less-than-shocking
misconduct; 33 (4) to deter the police from using the techniques of an inquisitorial
125. 373 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1963).
126. Id. at 509.
127. Id. at 523 (Clark, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 514.
129. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
130. It may be argued that the Court is necessarily using the narrowest definition that would support holding a
confession involuntary on the weakest set of facts presented to the Court--the facts of Haynes. The problem with this
mode of analysis is that it makes the definition of involuntariness so fact-specific that the definition will be useless if the
next case involves different facts, as it inevitably will. It is therefore fruitless to try to infer or extrapolate a definition from
the facts and results of cases.
131. See Y. KA.tuss, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRE.L, MODEN C,As. PRocErDu 518-19 (1986); W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 84, at 265.
132. See Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1986); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1959);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)(dictum).
133. In cases in which the conduct of the police could hardly be regarded as falling below the minimum standards
of a civilized society, the Court has nevertheless alluded to police illegality. For example, in Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959), the Court said:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confession does not turn alone on their inherent
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system and to encourage them to use the techniques of an accusatorial system;134 and
(5) to deter the police from overbearing the suspect's will.135
Your initial reaction may be that these objectives at last give us the definitional
tool we need. Precisely the opposite is true, however. Each of the objectives is
problematic in one or more ways, and the very number of them obfuscates rather than
clarifies.
Look first at the unreliability and shocking misconduct objectives. Each is a
traditional due process concern 36 and each will explain a case such as Brown or
perhaps Ashcraft. But neither objective will explain Spano or Haynes. It is highly
unlikely that the confession in either case was false and also unlikely that the police
tactics would produce false confessions in other cases. Moreover, whatever one may
think of the tactics in Spano and Haynes, it is not easy to argue that they offend the
minimum standards of a civilized society and therefore shock our conscience. Thus,
these themes, although part of traditional due process analysis, are too narrow to
explain the range of cases in which confessions have been held involuntary. 137
The remaining themes are even more troublesome. The Court has said in some
cases that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law, thus suggesting that
a purpose of the involuntary confession rule is deterring violations of law that fall
short of being profoundly shocking. 38 However, the Court has never made clear
untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the
law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.
This suggests that one purpose of the involuntary confession rule is to deter illegal police conduct even though the conduct
is not fundamentally unfair or shocking to the Court's sense of justice.
134. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961).
135. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
136. In connection with unreliability as a due process concern, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294,
295, 302 (1973) (denial of opportunity to cross-examine adverse witness and to introduce reliable exculpatory hearsay
evidence); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (unnecessarily suggestive identification); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)
(indigent's right to timely appointment of counsel in capital case); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (trial by
judge with financial interest in convicting defendant); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (trial under influence of
mob domination); Grano, supra note 5, at 919-22. The Supreme Court has recently made clear, however, that a putatively
unreliable confession is not per se inadmissible as involuntary. Rather, coercive police activity is a required predicate.
Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
In connection with shocking misconduct as a due process theme, see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(forcing emetic into suspect and pumping his stomach); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462,473 (1942) (dictum) (right to
counsel), overruled on other grounds, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEu, supra note
84, at 43.
137. A complicating factor is that the reliability theme lacks a clear focus. "[Tihe confession cases do not indicate
clearly whether the due process inquiry should focus on the likelihood of unreliability in a particular case or on the general
risk of unreliability created by a given stratagem." Grano, supra note 5, at 921. See id. at 922; Y. KA5isAR, supra note
22, at 20-24. The Court has recently noted that the shocking misconduct theme deals with interrogation techniques that,
" Ieither in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect are so offensive to a civilized system
of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Miller v. Fenton,
106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985). It remains to be seen whether this statement will be applied to the reliability theme of the
involuntary confession rule.
An additional uncertainty plagues the reliability theme. It is not clear whether this theme is concerned to avoid only
the wholly false confession or whether it also seeks to avoid confessions that are partly false. According to some
commentators, the answer is the former. See authorities collected in Herman, supra note 22, at 454 n.25. For arguments
that partial unreliability may be the greater risk, see id.; Saltzburg, supra note 18, at 24.
138. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,320-21 (1959); Grano,
supra note 5, at 923-24.
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whether it was referring to state or federal law, to common, statutory or
constitutional law.139 In short, it has never identified the broken law, and thus has
given the police no guidance. It is true that many of the Court's involuntary
confession cases probably involved a violation of statutes that require a prompt first
appearance. However, it is hard to see why a statutory violation should necessarily
be treated as offending due process. t40 This objective, therefore, raises more
questions than it answers.
The dichotomy between an accusatorial and an inquisitorial system is at least as
problematic. In the first place, the line between the two systems is far from clear. 141
Thus, it is of little help to be told that our system is accusatorial and that the police
must adhere to its standards. Moreover, as actually administered by the Supreme
Court, the standards of an accusatorial system apparently do not prohibit the police
from arresting suspects who would rather not be arrested, from interrogating them
although they would rather not be interrogated, and from subjecting them to some
pressure to confess. Of course, the police cannot go too far, but the standards of an
accusatorial system do not tell us how far that is. Thus, once again we find statements
that are too imprecise to be useful. 142
The free will theme is similarly bereft of guidance. I explored this point earlier
when I discussed the Schneckloth case, 143 and it is not necessary to repeat the
discussion here.
A few minutes ago, I raised a question: under the Supreme Court's involuntary
confession rule, what is the meaning of the words "voluntary" and "involuntary?"
In an effort to answer this question, I used three standard analytical tools-the
Court's verbalization of a definition, extrapolating or inferring a definition from the
facts and results of cases, and inferring a definition from the objectives of the
involuntary confession rule. None of these approaches is very useful. One can say
with some confidence that a confession is involuntary if obtained by a brutal beating,
as in Brown, or by prolonged and uninterrupted interrogation, as in Ashcraft. But
beyond these extreme situations, little can be said. Since the rule requires us to
consider the totality of the circumstances, a slight change in the facts may change the
result. Thus, today's decision is of limited utility in guiding tomorrow's practices and
decisions.
139. See cases cited supra note 138.
140. This point is convincingly made in Grano, supra note 5, at 923-24.
141. See Grano, supra note 5, at 934; See also Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the
Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 Ai. Cria. L. Rsv. 1, 22-24 and n. 148 (1979).
142. A major difference between our accusatorial and an inquisitorial system is that in our accusatorial system the
privilege against self-incrimination plays a more prominent and protective role. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7
(1964). The privilege, however, protects only against "compelled" self-incrimination, and "compelled" is no clearer
than "involuntary." Thus, it hardly helps to say that an "involuntary" confession is one that has been obtained by
methods that offend accusatorial precepts.
143. Supra, notes 103-08, and accompanying text. The Court recently roiled the muddy waters by holding in
Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986), that the defendant's confession was voluntary even though, as a result of
mental disease, he heard the voice of God commanding him either to confess or to commit suicide. The defendant's lack
of free will was deemed irrelevant unless caused by police coercion. Thus, the Court linked the free will theme, which
is problematic in its own right, to the equally problematic theme of police misconduct.
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Legal rules are addressed to audiences. If the rules are vague, the audiences
suffer. The audiences for the involuntary confession rule are police officers who
interrogate and obtain confessions, lawyers who try criminal cases, and judges who
decide them. Of these three audiences, the lawyers suffer least. They have the
advantage of being advocates. They know the result they want to reach and they will
often try to match the facts of their case as closely as possible to the facts of some
favorable precedent without paying too close attention to the subtleties of doctrine.
The police and judges, on the other hand, are in a different situation. The police have
to decide during the course of an interrogation what tactics to use and how far to go
with them. Judges have to decide whether the police went too far. If the law
governing these decision-making processes is vague, and it is, these processes will
suffer. They will also suffer in another way. Police officers want to obtain
confessions and are willing to go to the brink to get them. A few officers are willing
to go beyond. Although even the most precise rules will not deter an officer who is
strongly motivated to ignore them, vague rules encourage violation. 14 4 If a rule is
vague, the officer can always say with plausibility, "I thought I was permitted to do
it." So also with judges. Trial judges do not want to exclude evidence that the
prosecution needs for a conviction, particularly when they believe that the evidence
is reliable, and appellate judges are reluctant to overturn convictions and order retrials
with attendant expense and delay. The vaguer the standards, the easier it is for judges
to act on their impulses in doubtful or marginal cases. 145
Lest you think I overstate the case, I want to share with you the words of a
person who is well known for his expertise in criminal procedure and constitutional
law-Professor Joseph Grano of Wayne State University. Professor Grano is no
friend of Miranda; he believes it was wrongly decided. Nevertheless, in an article that
urges the overruling of Miranda, he refers to the "intolerable uncertainty that
characterized the thirty-year reign of the due process voluntariness doctrine in the law
of confessions." 146 Recent cases bear out this observation. Although Miranda has
largely replaced the involuntary confession rule, the latter still exists; it was not
overruled by Miranda. 147 Cases do arise in which it is claimed that a confession, apart
from Miranda, was involuntary, and courts, as they did in the pre-Miranda days are
still holding confessions admissible in doubtful or marginal cases. Let me give you
five examples. 148
144. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 869. The analogy to vagueness in criminal statutes should not be overlooked.
See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRea NAL LAw 94-95 (2d ed. 1986).
145. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 869-70. Moreover, even if the judge has good intentions, the very vagueness
of the rules may make it hard to say that the police or a lower court erred. Id. at 870.
146. Grano, supra note 5, at 863. See also id. at 863 n.20; id. at 864 nn.25-27; Schulhofer, supra note 19 at 867-78;
White, supra note 18, at 10-16. For an effort to defend the involuntary confession rule, see Caplan, supra note 18, at
1432-35. Professor Caplan regards the vagueness of the rule as "shrewd and responsible pragmatism." Id. at 1434.
147. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 877. The involuntary confession rule, but not Miranda, govers
non-custodial interrogation by the police. Id. The involuntary confession rule also governs cases of custodial interrogation
in which Miranda has been complied with and the suspect decides to waive. whether the suspect's answers are admissible
depends on whether they are voluntary.
148. In addition to the examples set out in the text, see the cases collected in Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 876 n.52;
White, supra note 18, at 12-15 and nn.67, 70-73.
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The first is State v. Waugh. 149 During an interrogation about a murder, Waugh
claimed that the victim had died of a heart attack in Waugh's car and that in a panic
he had dumped the deceased's body. Thereafter, Waugh asked at least three times to
telephone his wife. The police denied all requests, thus keeping him incommunicado.
Waugh then underwent a polygraph test. The examiner told him that he had truthfully
admitted being an alcoholic but that he had falsely denied killing the deceased. The
examiner then said that he wanted to help Waugh by getting him treatment for his
alcoholism. After many such statements, Waugh finally confessed. Although this
case bears remarkable resemblance to Haynes v. Washington,1 50 the Kansas Supreme
Court held that it was distinguishable. In Haynes, the police told the defendant that
he would have to confess before he would be allowed to call his wife. In Waugh,
however, no such statement was made; the police merely denied the suspect's
requests. Thus, the confession was "voluntary."
The second case is Vance v. Bordenkircher,15 1 in which the court held voluntary
a confession made by a 15-year-old who had an IQ of sixty-two and a mental age of
nine. The confession was made after nine hours of intermittent interrogation, without
counsel or other support.
The third example is United States ex rel. Cerda v. Greer.152 A 16-year-old
suspect was arrested at 1:00 a.m. and was questioned at 4:00 a.m., 9:00 a.m., noon,
and 6:00 p.m., for about thirty-five minutes per session. A police officer told him to
tell the truth or he would "get his ass kicked." 1 53 His confession was held voluntary
and admissible.
The penultimate example is Martin v. Wainwright.154 In this case, Martin was
sentenced to death based in part on his confession. He was interrogated for five hours
after the police refused to honor his request that the interrogation be put off for a day.
During the interrogation, one detective played the "bad guy," yelling and cursing at
Martin. Another detective and an assistant prosecutor played the "good guys,"
feigning sympathy and promising to get psychiatric assistance for him. The assistant
prosecutor told Martin that Florida had a bifurcated proceeding in capital cases, and
that, although a confession would not help him in the guilt-determining phase, it
would help him in the sentencing phase. The Florida courts and the federal courts
held that the confession was voluntary and admissible.
The final case is State v. Jenkins,155 also a death case. Approximately one-half
hour before the police questioned him, Jenkins was taken to a hospital emergency
room in deep shock from a gunshot wound in his chest and spinal cord which left him
paralyzed. He was in pain, and a tube had been inserted into his chest to relieve
149. 238 Kan. 537, 712 P.2d 1243 (1986).
150. 373 U.S. 503 (1963), discussed supra, at notes 123-28, and accompanying text.
151. 692 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983).
152. 613 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. I11. 1985).
153. Id. at 1122.
154. 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985), modified and reh'g denied, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
307 (1986).
155. 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 19 (1985).
I consulted with the attorney who represented the defendant in the Ohio appellate courts, so I am not merely a spectator
as far as this case is concerned.
1987]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:733
pressure from fluid buildup. His blood pressure had been very erratic although it was
apparently beginning to stabilize. He had a low IQ and had been in a class for slow
learners. Although he was going nowhere, the police questioned him and obtained a
confession. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the confession was voluntary and
admissible and it affirmed the conviction and death sentence.156
These cases, although all decided in recent years, are remarkably representative
of the cases that were decided earlier-in the good old days of police interrogation
before Miranda. Small wonder, then, that in a period of thirty years or so, the
Supreme Court granted review in over thirty-five cases in which confessions had been
held voluntary.' 57 Small wonder, too, that the Court reversed the conviction in most
of these cases.' 58 And small wonder that the Court became disaffected from its own
work product.159 All students of the Court recognize that it cannot police the
application of doctrine by lower courts.' 60 All it can hope to do is make doctrine
intelligible and give illustrative examples. The Court tried to do that in the confession
cases, and it failed. Given the inherent vagueness of the crucial concepts and the
156. In many respects, Jenkins is similar to Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), in which the Court held the
confession involuntary. Although both cases involved the interrogation of a seriously wounded suspect in a hospital, the
Ohio Supreme Court in Jenkins distinguished Mincey primarily on the ground that the interrogation in Mincey lasted
considerably longer and that certain indicia of untrustworthiness in Mincey were absent in Jenkins. 15 Ohio St. 3d at 232,
473 N.E.2d at 321.
The five cases discussed in the text were the only cases that I referred to in the Kennedy Lecture to illustrate the
proposition that the involuntary confession rule continues to work poorly. However, a case that was decided after the
lecture was given may illustrate the point better than any I discussed. The case is Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1986), on remandfirom 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985). At about 11:00 p.m., the police interrogated the suspect at his place of
employment for about forty-five minutes, but the suspect denied involvement in a murder. He agreed to accompany his
interrogators to a state police barracks. At the barracks, he was placed in isolation under guard for about an hour. At 1:47
a.m., another interrogation began. After being interrogated for fifty-three minutes, the suspect confessed. The
interrogation involved intense nagging, wheedling and cajoling. The officer suggested repeatedly that the crime was the
product of mental disease for which the suspect needed treatment and that the officer's only interest was in helping
the suspect. The officer explicitly promised psychiatric assistance, and some of the officer's statements implied that the
suspect would not be prosecuted. Immediately upon confession, the suspect collapsed in a trance and was taken to a
hospital. In a 2-1 decision, the court held the confession voluntary and admissible.
The Miller case is quite unusual and compelling in one respect: the second interrogation was tape recorded and the
entire transcript is appended to the dissenting opinion. In addition, selected portions of the transcript are highlighted in
the majority and dissenting opinions. I cannot do justice to the facts of the case without reproducing the entire transcript.
Consequently, I urge interested readers to consult the opinions and make up their own minds. Even a cursory reading will
force one to agree with the Supreme Court's characterization of voluntariness as "an amphibian." See note 104, supra.
Indicative of the amphibian's slipperiness is the fact that of the fifteen judges who considered the voluntariness issue in
Miller, eight believed the confession was voluntary and seven involuntary.
For other dubious holdings that a confession was voluntary, see Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(Kidnapping suspect was arrested and beaten by police until he disclosed victim's location. Taken to jail, he was advised
of rights, questioned some time after beating occurred, and confessed. The interrogators had not been at the scene of the
beating. The confession was held not to be the product of the prior beating.); People v. Kincaid, 87 111. 2d 107, 429
N.E.2d 508 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1024 (1982) (Suspect was interrogated while naked, after he had attempted
suicide and had been given a major tranquilizer which could have caused lethargy and confusion.); Mayer v. State, 618
P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1980) (Confession to homicide not rendered involuntary by suspect's youth (age 17), isolation from
parental advice and support, emotional upset, intoxication, and pain from an earlier beating by the intended victim.)
157. See Comment, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 313 n.l (1964).
158. Id.
159. See Y. KAsesAR, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEm, MoDERN CRIMiNAL PocEsuRE 523-24 (6th ed. 1986); id. at 524, quoting
Justice Black as remarking during the oral arguments in Miranda,
[1If you are going to determine [the admissibility of the confession] each time on the circumstances, [if] this
Court will take them one by one [it] is more than we are capable of doing.
160. See supra note 157. See also Herman, supra note 22, at 457.
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many rationales underlying the rule, failure was foreordained. So also was the search
for an alternative.
Please do not misunderstand what I am saying. I am not saying that Miranda was
correctly decided. I happen to believe that it was, but that is beside the point. The
point is that the dissenters in 1966 and the Attorney General in 1985 were simply
wrong in their claim that we got along well with the law that antedated Miranda. We
did not, we are not getting along well with its vestiges today, and recognition of these
simple facts should inform any reasonable debate about whether Miranda should be
overruled.
I want to leave you with a few questions. Why all the fuss? After all, most of
these people are guilty anyway, aren't they? So why should we care how the police
get the confessions that establish their guilt? These are troubling questions, and they
deserve an answer. I want to suggest three. First, even accepting for the sake of
argument that the suspect is guilty, it is important to determine the degree of guilt.
Frequently, this determination is based on the perpetrator's mental state at the time
of the offense. 61 Mental state is ordinarily a subjective phenomenon, and the words
a suspect uses to describe it may therefore be crucially important. t62 I have both
prosecuted and defended criminal cases. Based on that experience,
I am convinced... that there is a much greater risk [than the wholly false confession]: the
interrogee who is guilty of some wrongdoing may, either through ignorance or in order to
end the pressure of interrogation accede to a more serious version of the offense. The
resulting confession is partially true. However, the one or two-line inaccuracy or falsity may
spell the difference between an aggravated offense and a mitigated offense. 163
Thus, even assuming guilt, it is important to develop rules to control interrogation.
Second, contrary to what the Attorney General has said, not all suspects who are
taken in for interrogation are guilty. t64 Consequently, interrogation must be con-
trolled to protect the innocent.
The third answer has nothing to do with the reliability of confessions, but is just
as important. It is also easy to forget. As Justice Frankfurter observed some years
ago, "the history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards," 165 and "not the least significant test of the quality of a civilization is its
treatment of those charged with crime." 166
161. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scotr, CmtA LAw 212-16 (2d ed. 1986).
162. For example, in the law of homicide, premeditated killings are generally treated more harshly than purposeful,
but unpremeditated, killings, id. at 642, and purposeful killings are treated more harshly than unintentional, but unlawful,
killings. Id. at 668-Si. In addition, defenses such as mistake, intoxication, and self-defense involve an inquiry into the
actor's mental processes. Id. at 405-07 (mistake); id. at 387-92 (intoxication); id. at 454-58 (self-defense). The precise
words with which a suspect characterizes his mental state may therefore be of crucial importance in determining whether
he is guilty of any offense, and, if so, of what degree he is guilty. For a dramatic illustration, see Record, p. 138, Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), in which the suspect, skillfully interrogated by an assistant prosecutor, admitted an
intention to kill.
163. Herman, supra note 22, at 454 n.25. See also Saltzburg, supra note 18, at 24.
164. See, e.g., F. SAsmo, WHrmrom (1969) (recounting celebrated case of suspect whose detailed, 60-page
confession to two murders was false); Time, Feb. 5, 1965, at 69 (same).
165. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
166. Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (concurring opinion).
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